Donald Trump’s comeback to the American political scene has triggered a series of significant transformations in U.S. foreign policy, causing confusion among its allies, most notably the European Union (EU). This change in direction, marked by the U.S. aligning closely with Benjamin Netanyahu’s regime in Israel and engaging in bilateral talks with Russia regarding the Ukraine conflict, has created considerable friction between the EU nations and the new U.S. government. The consequent chill in transatlantic relations may have far-reaching effects, particularly in the Indo-Pacific area, where U.S. and European strategies may increasingly diverge. The driving forces behind this misalignment may include ideological differences, changes in security and defense objectives, and diverging economic necessities.
Shortly after Trump’s rise to power, ideological discrepancies between the U.S. and the EU started to surface, posing a significant threat to future cooperative actions on the global stage, including in the Indo-Pacific. The positions expressed by influential figures in the new Republican government, for instance, Elon Musk’s backing of Germany’s far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), and disruptive remarks by Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference highlight this growing chasm. These events underline the emergence of two distinct democratic philosophies in the U.S. and the EU, which shape their long-term objectives and threat identification.
The 2021 strategy suggests that EU’s actions in the Indo-Pacific should be guided by principles such as promoting democracy, upholding the rule of law, safeguarding human rights, implementing the United Nations Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, and adhering to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. However, none of these principles feature in the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities. Thus, it seems unlikely that Washington and Brussels will maintain a unified political narrative on key Indo-Pacific issues, like the Taiwan and South China Sea disputes.
Furthermore, without a shared understanding of international law and the role of key players, such as the U.N., it seems improbable that the EU and U.S. will continue to coordinate their strategies in support of their Euro-Atlantic bloc allies. This lack of a common transatlantic vision may lead to severe friction between the U.S. and EU member states like France and Germany. Consequently, European players may distance themselves from U.S. foreign policy, which often aligned in the past. This could result in Europe becoming more autonomous in its approach to the Indo-Pacific, with member states likely focusing more on bilateral relations.
In parallel, the discord between the EU and the U.S. on the Ukraine conflict is pushing EU member states to expedite rearmament, as exemplified by the launch of the ReArm Europe plan by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. This is also prompting them to restructure institutionally to confront escalating threats in the European vicinity. With heightened focus on securing the eastern flank against Russian aggression, and the possibility of U.S. disengagement from Europe, the Indo-Pacific might fall lower on Europe’s list of political and security concerns. This shift could reverse the trend of an expanding EU presence and the increasing involvement of member states in the region.
The absence of political alignment between the EU and U.S. could lead to the first casualties of these changes in the Indo-Pacific- maritime security. Europe may prioritize the economic aspects of its regional engagement over a broader strategic approach. This could signal a return to viewing the Indo-Pacific primarily as a region of significant economic opportunities instead of one of crucial strategic importance. In this context, national Indo-Pacific strategies, often shaped by discussions with Washington, could be relegated or even revised in the long term, especially if Trump’s foreign policy proves more than just a brief interlude.
To gauge the impact of Trump’s foreign policy on the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, it’s important to consider the relationship between the U.S. and the Baltic States. These states, in sync with the U.S., have incorporated Indo-Pacific issues into their national strategic discourse, traditionally centered on the Russian threat. Lithuania, for instance, has developed a regional perspective focusing on China’s increasing assertiveness and the dangerous, unrestricted partnership between China and Russia. The election of Estonia’s Kaja Kallas as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy seemed to signal a full alignment in foreign policy between the United States and the EU, both in Europe where they faced the common Russian adversary and in Asia where they sought to balance China’s assertiveness.
However, the Trump administration has transformed this dynamic, marginalizing the Baltic states in the discourse on the EU’s future. Kallas, after being excluded from negotiations on Ukraine, was denied a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, officially due to scheduling issues. Given these circumstances, it’s hard to imagine how Kallas, who had previously stated her intention to strengthen EU-U.S. dialogue on the Indo-Pacific, can establish a framework for transatlantic cooperation in the region.
In light of these developments, it’s possible that the EU may return to a purely economic approach towards the Indo-Pacific. This could lead to attempts by the EU and some member states to revive relations with China, after years of escalating tensions driven by the growing Sino-Russian political and economic partnership. An EU grappling with the dual economic challenges of increasing defense spending and managing the threat of U.S. tariffs may slow down its strategy of de-risking from China.
Ironically, this change may occur just as the EU seemed ready to redefine its regional strategy, particularly through the revival of its strategic partnership with India, aimed at addressing, at least in the medium to long term, the issue of significant economic and trade dependence on China. Currently, despite differences in perspective between Europeans and Americans on most international issues, there is notable consensus regarding the desire to build positive relations with New Delhi. However, the fate of unresolved issues and critical projects, such as the EU-India Free Trade Agreement and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), will also be influenced by the trajectory of U.S. protectionist and neo-mercantilist policies.
In conclusion, Trump’s influence on European strategy in the Indo-Pacific may lead to a slowdown and a reshaping of the EU’s regional external action in the short term. In the medium to long term, particularly if transatlantic relations continue to deteriorate, the divergences in approach and vision between the U.S. and the EU regarding the Indo-Pacific could deepen significantly, with far-reaching implications for regional balances.
