After a lengthy traditional Lunar New Year holiday, Vietnam has embarked on a comprehensive “revolution” of institutional reforms aimed at fine-tuning the party-state apparatus. Prior to the holiday, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) greenlighted the government’s streamlining plan. The final stage of this transformation involves an extraordinary session organized by the Party-controlled National Assembly, anticipated to take place on February 12-17, to formally implement the plan.
The approved proposal outlines a significant reduction in government infrastructure, downsizing to 14 ministries and three agencies. Additionally, 13 general departments, 738 departments and bureaus, and 3,303 sub-departments will be dissolved, along with 201 public service units. In line with this, over 100,000 state civil servants are expected to be relieved of their duties. Amidst societal concerns and potential employee dissatisfaction, top Party and government leaders have called for sacrifices from officials and Party members, asserting that the reform has garnered strong unity and consensus within the Party and society.
However, the CPV Politburo and Central Committee’s concentration on revolutionizing the operational apparatus – the micro- or middle-level – seems to have led to the overlooking of the supreme decision-making apparatus, or the CPV’s macro-level power structure. This is a particularly sensitive issue as it involves the concentration and control of power, and striking a balance between factions.
The macro-level power structure refers to the four highest positions in the party-state, known as the “four pillars”: the position of Party chairman or general secretary, and the posts of president, prime minister, and National Assembly chairman. The boundaries between the first and second positions are sometimes indistinct, especially in recent terms.
The CPV Statutes specify that the general secretary is the Party’s chief and chairperson of the Central Military Commission controlling the military. Meanwhile, the 2013 Constitution identifies the president as the head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but under the Party’s leadership. Generally, the general secretary is perceived to hold the highest national authority, implying the president’s role is ceremonial.
This perception has been amplified in the CPV’s 12th tenure (2016-2021) and the current 13th tenure, where the general secretary often acted as the de facto head of state. For instance, General Secretary To Lam has held talks with several heads of state, including U.S. President Donald Trump, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and conducted state-level diplomatic activities.
The CPV once had a political project to renovate the Vietnamese political system during the 2001-2010 period, which proposed the general secretary also serve as president. However, the project was not implemented due to untimely circumstances.
The current comprehensive reform of the Vietnamese political system presents an opportune moment for the CPV to consider a parallel revolution in the Party’s macro-level power structure. The challenge lies not in an individual being empowered, but in how power is controlled and accountability ensured. The CPV now faces a choice to implement the project either now or after the 14th congress in 2026. Both the Constitution and the CPV Statutes would need to be amended before this can happen. Until then, Vietnam’s institutional and political reforms will remain incomplete.
