On October 16, Russian aerial attacks targeted a furniture factory, a lumber mill, and an olive oil mill in Syria’s Idlib Province, causing the death of 10 civilians, including a child. This information was confirmed by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights based in the UK and the White Helmets civil defense force.
Just two days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin was seen in the role of a peacemaker in the Middle East during a press meeting with journalists from countries that form the BRICS association. This was ahead of a summit scheduled later in the week. Putin stated that Moscow is prepared to do all it can to halt what he termed as the “horrific attacks on civilian targets in the Gaza Strip”. He went on to offer Moscow’s services as a mediator in the situation.
Putin expressed his fervent hope that an escalation of the conflict could be avoided. However, the lethal bombings by Russia in Syria contradict this sentiment. Analysts suggest that while Moscow may genuinely want to avoid a larger war, they are content with the current level of violence in the Middle East. This is because they can exploit the chaos to advance their interests in the region, in Ukraine, and globally.
“War, confusion, and an inconsistent U.S. policy have made it easier for Russia to navigate” in the Middle East, says Thanassis Cambanis, director of Century International, an arm of The Century Foundation, a U.S.-based research organization.
There are a few reasons why the present level of unrest and volatility in the Middle East works in Moscow’s favor.
Hanna Notte, a Berlin-based expert on Russian foreign policy, calls one of the reasons the “distraction dividend.” The crisis in the Middle East diverts global attention away from Ukraine, where Russian forces are daily causing civilian casualties in a brutal invasion that shows no signs of ending after almost four years.
It compels Washington and its allies to spend money, arms, and resources in the Middle East while they are struggling to contain Russia in a European war that could have significant implications for the West.
Furthermore, the war in Ukraine is used by Putin, who sees it as part of a cultural conflict with the US and the European Union, to draw as many countries as possible closer to Russia’s side.
Since Putin initiated the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the conflict with the West over Ukraine has become the primary force shaping Russian policy in the Middle East, according to Notte, a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
On this backdrop, the Israeli attacks in Gaza and Lebanon provide an opportunity for Moscow to court countries in the Global South and worldwide. They can portray the violence in the Middle East as the result of misguided and destructive policies of the West, specifically the United States.
For Moscow, using the crisis in the Middle East and the war in Gaza to criticize Washington is an obvious choice, says Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Washington-based Middle East Institute.
However, Russia’s influence in the Middle East has its limits. While Russia can assert a significant role in the region without having to do much, the outbreak of a larger war could expose its vulnerabilities.
The war against Ukraine has intensified Moscow’s alignment with the anti-Western forces in the region, says Notte.
However, Russia is still attempting to strike a balance in the Middle East. It does not wish to upset Israel or the Persian Gulf states excessively. On the other hand, it has minimal or no chance of turning countries in the region against the United States, even though they could cooperate in some areas.
In spite of the warm rhetoric and treaties, such as the “comprehensive strategic partnership” pact that Russia is expected to sign soon with Iran, Moscow’s alliance with Tehran and its allies only extends as far as the Kremlin believes it will serve its interests.
For now, Vatanka says, Putin wants to maintain the status quo in the region, as unstable and bloody as it may be.
Others concur with this assessment.
“The degree of tension and the events have so far not threatened Russian interests or positions in the region,” says Notte. But she suggests that we could be approaching a tipping point, particularly if there are Israeli attacks against Iran, or a significant deterioration in Syria. In such cases, the risks could start outweighing some of the benefits.
According to Notte, if Israelis attack Iran, it could strain its defense industry, “something that Russia probably does not want to see, given this enhanced partnership that they have with the Iranians.”
Another potential outcome of an Israeli attack on Iran could be exposing a certain level of Russian impotence, as she doesn’t see Russia getting involved in defending Iran in the event of such escalation and Israeli retaliation. This could damage Russia’s reputation.
Notte suggests that Moscow will continue to try to maintain balance, but if the ‘Axis of Resistance’ continues to face pressure in the region, Russia may start providing more assistance to Iranian partners like the Huthis and Hezbollah.